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Greenhouse gas emissions originating from the built environment play a significant role toward 30 
climate change. Carefully planning the future of the building sector is key to mitigating these 31 
emissions. Addressing this problem using a predictive approach may miss possible futures we 32 
cannot anticipate. Using explorative scenarios to perform futures analysis helps widen the range 33 
of futures taken into account, which minimises this risk. Tools which use scenarios to help study 34 
the resilience of sustainable solutions for UK urban environment are already available. However, 35 
they do not facilitate in-depth analysis of future household energy demand. This paper considers 36 
how one such tool, 'Designing Resilient Cities' (DRC), could be modified appropriately. It includes: 37 
(1) a series of indicators representing factors affecting the energy demand in dwellings, and (2) 38 
their characteristics for each scenario to complement the narratives in DRC. As a case study to 39 
validate these additions, the resilience of a recommendation to decrease domestic electricity 40 
consumption is evaluated. 41 
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1 Introduction 58 
 59 
Although we live in a world where post-truth intoxicates the beliefs of millions of people worldwide, there 60 
is scientific consensus on human-made climate change driven by greenhouse gases (Cook et al., 2016). 61 
Climate change is one of the Stockholm Resilience Centre's boundaries defining a safe operating space 62 
for humanity which we have already violated (Rockström et al., 2009). In order to mitigate this threat, 63 
most countries are setting targets to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions. In the case of the UK, in 64 
2008 the Government's Climate Change Bill set a legally binding target of a 80 % reduction in carbon 65 
dioxide emissions by 2050 compared to 1990 levels (DEFRA, 2008), and it recognises that the built 66 
environment plays a crucial role in achieving this target (Department of Energy and Climate Change, 67 
2009). 68 
 69 
Under business as usual, energy demand in the global building sector is expected to increase by 50 % 70 
by 2050 (IEA, 2013). It has been estimated that to achieve the global goal of limiting the temperature 71 
rise to 2 ºC, the building sector has to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions by 77 % compared to the 72 
2013 baseline (IEA, 2013). Carefully planning the future of the built environment —as well as its energy 73 
supply technologies and networks— is key in this effort, as we need to ensure resilient and flexible 74 
solutions that continue to perform effectively in the future. 75 
 76 
The future is, however, uncertain. Solutions which seem very appropriate today may not be useful in a 77 
matter of few years if this uncertainty is not taken into account during their design phase. To not do so 78 
would mean wasting resources and effort in what would soon become stranded assets. Present 79 
research on sustainability faces this problem principally by utilising a predictive approach —i.e. based 80 
on current and historical trends and predictions. This is perfectly valid, however, it does not account for 81 
futures we cannot anticipate (Rogers et al., 2012).  82 
 83 
Scenario analysis can help in this regard as it facilitates widening the range of futures considered. So 84 
far, scenario analysis has been used mainly to study the consequences of global level interventions, 85 
long-term evolution of different systems, and to inform polices (Boyko et al., 2012). However, it is not 86 




different futures could have on a specific system. In particular, scenario analysis could be used to study 88 
the development of domestic energy demand, and the performance of interventions aimed at 89 
decreasing it. 90 
 91 
In the future scenarios literature, there exist different types of scenarios, tools and methods designed 92 
to help perform futures analysis in a wide range of contexts. One tool which is especially suited to study 93 
the performance of sustainable interventions in the urban environment is 'Designing Resilient Cities' 94 
(DRC) (Lombardi et al., 2012), with their 'Urban Futures Method' (Rogers et al., 2012). This tool was 95 
developed by a project called 'Urban Futures' (UF), which published it in 2012 in parallel to a special 96 
issue of this same journal. That issue was dedicated to the use of future scenarios to evaluate the 97 
resilience of sustainable solutions in the urban environment in UK (Rogers, 2012). 98 
 99 
UF used as the basis for their scenarios those developed by the Global Scenarios Group (GSG), a 100 
project from the Tellus Institute. These scenarios are integrated —considering major economic, social, 101 
cultural, institutional, technological and environmental questions at the same time— and disaggregated 102 
by regions and sectors; and they convey this information in various points in the future until the year 103 
2100 (Raskin, Electris and Rosen, 2010). These are explorative scenarios which cover a broad range 104 
of possible directions in which the future could unfold, and can be used to formulate 'what if' questions 105 
(Rogers et al., 2012). GSG took special care to make the scenarios a logical and plausible evolution 106 
from the world today and internally consistent (Gallopin et al., 1997). UF adapted four of these scenarios 107 
to UK cities in 2050 and developed DRC to help to evaluate the resilience of sustainable urban 108 
interventions (Boyko et al., 2012; Lombardi et al., 2012). 109 
 110 
The four scenarios developed by UF are internally-consistent adaptations to the UK urban environment 111 
of the following GSG scenarios:  112 
 New Sustainability Paradigm (NSP) – engaged society with a shared vision for sustainability 113 
and quality of life, 114 
 Policy Reform (PR) – coordinated action from governments for sustainability and against 115 
poverty, 116 




 Fortress World (FW) – alliances of the powerful to protect their interests, security first; poor 118 
majority live outside the fortress (ratio 35:65).  119 
These four scenarios extend to the extremes of plausibility and are sufficiently distinct to cover a wide 120 
range of possible futures (Hunt et al., 2012a). The names of the scenarios give a good idea of their 121 
characteristics. However, if further description is sought, brief general narratives can be found in the 122 
following literature: for the general GSG scenarios see Hunt et al. (2012b), for a version representative 123 
of OECD countries see Rogers et al. (2012), and for the UK urban version developed by UF see Boyko 124 
et al. (2012) or Lombardi et al. (2012). 125 
 126 
The 'Urban Futures Method' "aims to broaden the way we think about the form, function, and context of 127 
urban development and regeneration by focussing on the likely long-term performance of today's urban 128 
design solutions, and their associated vulnerabilities" (Lombardi et al., 2012). This aim partly covers the 129 
study of the energy demand of UK's residential sector. However, to do an in-depth analysis of this topic, 130 
the tool has to be adapted. Fortunately, the scenarios used in DRC are designed in a way that new 131 
indicators and characteristics can be added to them, as well as new scenarios incorporated to the tool 132 
(Boyko et al., 2012). 133 
 134 
And so, the objective of this paper is to adapt the scenarios from DRC to the study of the energy demand 135 
of UK's residential sector. This is done by adding a set of indicators related to household energy demand 136 
or its causes, and developing their characteristics for each scenario, which increases the detail of 137 
information the scenarios provide in this domain. A short case study is also presented here to 138 
demonstrate the use of these additions. 139 
 140 
 141 
1.1 Future scenarios 142 
 143 
One very important characteristic of scenarios is that they do not intend to predict the future. What 144 
scenarios do, is to map a plausibility space in order to explore or study it (Schwartz, 1991; Foresight 145 




2012). Therefore, scenarios are tools to help thinking about the future in a structured way and based 147 
on a set of assumptions which are previously defined. 148 
 149 
There exist many types of scenarios with different features depending on the use to which they are put. 150 
Some, model possible outcomes and consequences from current actions and may not need any 151 
narrative —e.g., the different emissions scenarios that IPCC developed for each of their storylines 152 
(IPCC, 2000). The scenarios discussed here, in contrast, are defined by narratives and explore distinct 153 
plausible socio-economic futures which could arise from the present. 154 
 155 
The use of these kinds of scenarios provides information on the possible evolution of any subject of 156 
study in a range of futures. This can be valuable for many purposes. In particular, it can provide 157 
information on the performance of any proposed intervention in different futures, thus helping to improve 158 
its resilience —i.e. its effectiveness in all the scenarios— or, at least, informing of its weaknesses 159 
(Boyko et al., 2012; Lombardi et al., 2012; Rogers et al., 2012). 160 
 161 
The narrative of the scenarios in DRC comprises a short general narrative and the characteristics of a 162 
set of indicators. The general narrative describes briefly and precisely the main aspects of the scenario, 163 
and the characteristics of the indicators, its details. The indicators are variables that represent attributes 164 
of the system —e.g. the size of the population in the scenario— and they can represent any aspect(s) 165 
of interest. They have to be accurately defined, with a unit of measurement, and normally their value in 166 
a reference scenario or some kind of benchmark. The characteristics of an indicator quantify or qualify, 167 
with short statements, its performance under each scenario, normally in relation to the reference (Boyko 168 
et al., 2012). For ease of use, the trend in relation to the reference is also portrayed with an arrow. See 169 
Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the composition of a DRC scenario narrative. 170 
 171 





Figure 1. DRC scenario narrative composition. The narrative of each scenario comprises a brief general 174 
narrative describing the main aspects of the scenario and the characteristics describing the 175 
performance of a set of indicators in the scenario. These indicators are variables representing one or 176 
more attributes of the system. 177 
 178 
 179 
Note that all scenarios are defined by the same set of indicators; the differences in the characteristics 180 
of these indicators between the scenarios are what, in conjunction with the general narratives, portray 181 
the differences between the scenarios. In order for the scenarios to provide coherent information, it is 182 
important that the characteristics of the indicators are internally consistent and that they are based on 183 
the relevant literature. Both, GSG and UF have put great effort in doing so (GTI, 2018; Gallopin et al., 184 
1997; Raskin et al., 1998, 2002; Rogers et al., 2012). Otherwise, the characteristics of one indicator 185 
could be contradictory with those of another indicator or with the general narrative of the scenario.  186 




1.2 Energy demand in households 188 
 189 
Many highly interrelated factors play a role in determining the energy any given building will consume 190 
to establish and maintain a comfortable temperature, air quality and light levels (Thomas, 2006).  191 
 192 
Larger dwellings tend to use more energy, but still with extensive differences between similar dwellings 193 
(Wright, 2008). When trying to understand the key factors which explain the energy consumed in 194 
buildings, building factors alone are shown to explain at least 39 % of the variability of energy use in 195 
buildings (Sonderegger, 1978; Guerra Santin, Itard and Visscher, 2009; Huebner et al., 2015a). 196 
However, Huebner et al. (2015a) shows that when taking into account other factors (such as socio-197 
economic factors —which by themselves explain 24 % of variability) in a combined model, they can 198 
only explain 44 % of variability.  199 
 200 
This leaves more than 50 % of the variability in domestic energy consumption unexplained (Huebner et 201 
al., 2015b). Indeed, a crucial factor in the energy households consume is the behaviour of the 202 
inhabitants of the dwellings (Firth et al., 2008; Perry and Bessant, 2014). Heating (gas) consumption is 203 
mainly influenced by occupancy of the property (who, how long...) and temperature management (Fell 204 
and King, 2012; Weber et al., 2017), with ventilation behaviour having a major impact too (Weber et al., 205 
2017). Variables influenced by people have the strongest predictive power to explain English household 206 
non-heating electricity consumption (Huebner et al., 2016). This consumption is determined mainly by 207 
the type and number of electrical appliances, and the use the occupants make of them (Firth et al., 208 
2008; Huebner et al., 2016). However, studies repeatedly show that it is very difficult to change the 209 
energy behaviour of a large group of users (Perry and Bessant, 2014). 210 
 211 
The energy used for space heating is, by far, the largest slice of the energy used in UK households. 212 
Together with water heating —the second largest slice— they accounted for around 80 % of the energy 213 
used in UK households in 2011 (Palmer and Cooper, 2013). The energy source used for heating by the 214 
vast majority of homes in the UK (more than 80 %) is gas. Most of the non-gas energy used for heating, 215 
as well as virtually all the energy used for non-heating related purposes in UK households is electricity. 216 





Better building standards and new regulations mandating and promoting them promise to decrease the 219 
energy consumed in new buildings. However, there is a large stock of already constructed residences 220 
which need to be addressed; it is estimated that two-thirds of the dwellings likely to be in use in UK in 221 
2050 were already constructed in 2005 (Boardman et al., 2005). Therefore, significantly reducing the 222 
energy consumption of domestic buildings means the existing stock needs to be refurbished. It is 223 
calculated that with only the insulation of lofts and cavity walls, the consumption of fuel for space heating 224 
in England could be reduced by between 10 % and 17 % (Hong et al., 2006). 225 
 226 
Some recommendations to decrease household electricity demand arising from one of the biggest 227 
measurement campaigns ever made, in Sweden, are to limit the power consumption of appliances on 228 
standby to 0.5 W, encourage cutting the electrical supply of the appliances instead of leaving them in 229 
standby mode, and accelerating stricter consumption norms to make class A appliances become the 230 
standard (Zimmermann, 2009). 231 
 232 
A futures analysis of the factors affecting the energy demand in households would identify a range of 233 
distinct plausible paths this demand could take in the future, thus reducing the uncertainty faced when 234 
designing interventions, plans or regulations affecting it.  235 
 236 
 237 
2 Developing domestic energy demand indicators  238 
 239 
This section describes the methods used to define the indicators that needed to be developed to study 240 
the energy demand of the domestic sector in the context of the tool 'Designing Resilient Cities' (DRC) 241 
(Lombardi et al., 2012), as well as how their characteristics for the four future scenarios were developed. 242 
 243 
The system attributes that the indicators developed here represent are the main factors affecting the 244 
energy demand of households. These factors can be found, for example, in Bhattacharjee and Reichard 245 
(2011), Huebner et al. (2015a), Jones and Lomas, (2015), Jones, Fuertes and Lomas (2015). These 246 




each other and with those from DRC were synthesized to a single indicator (e.g. the factors 'number of 248 
rooms', 'number of bedrooms' and 'number of floors' were blended into 'total floor area'); sets of factors 249 
conveying redundant or overlapping information were grouped to form a smaller number of indicators 250 
when this did not imply significant loss of information (e.g. three factors grouped to create two 251 
indicators); and factors with smaller or no clear impact in the energy demand of households, or without 252 
reliable information to characterise an indicator, were discarded (e.g. the infancy of domestic energy 253 
storage technologies would have made the analysis of their future evolution very uncertain). Then a 254 
justification and/or definition was written for each indicator along with the question the indicator answers. 255 
 256 
Before developing the characteristics of an indicator, the current value of the indicator was found, and 257 
the factors on which the indicator depends were listed. Then, the characteristics of the indicators which 258 
give information about these factors (both, from DRC and from the list of indicators developed for this 259 
analysis) were put together. If needed, missing information about any of the factors was added from the 260 
literature related to the GSG (GSG, Tellus Institute), as well as the characteristics of other related 261 
indicators and/or context information extracted from the general narrative of the scenarios. See the 262 
indicators and other information used to derive the characteristics of each new indicator in Table 1. With 263 
this information the narrative for the characteristics of the new indicators was derived for each scenario, 264 
and their general trend in relation to the baseline symbolized by an arrow. Figure 2 depicts an analogy 265 
between the process to derive the characteristics of a new indicator for one scenario and a sum. As 266 
many indicators depend on each other, iterations of the whole process helped improve the final result. 267 
Generally, for clarity, a short review of the information put together for each scenario was written (see 268 
Table A1 - 'Review and context' in Appendix). In case of isolated discrepancies between the 269 
characteristics of the indicators used to derive new indicators and the general narrative of the scenarios, 270 
the general narrative has been used. Find a brief justification on the choice of indicators in the 271 
Supplementary information S1. 272 
 273 





Table 1. Indicators and other information used to derive each of the new indicator's characteristics. References: E[R] report (Greenpeace, 2015), General narratives from DRC 276 
(Lombardi et al., 2012), General GSG narratives (D. V. L. L. Hunt, Lombardi, Atkinson, Barber, et al., 2012), Technical document (Electris et al., 2009), Table generator tool 277 
(Tellus Institute, no date). 278 
Indicator Indicators from 'Designing resilient cities' Indicators developed in this work Other factors and sources 
Adoption of domestic (or 
community) micro-generation 
 Public service spending 
 Energy efficiency of building and urban morphology 
 Energy prices (domestic) 
 Attitudes to energy efficiency and 
sustainability 
 Information in the E[R] report 
 General narratives from DRC 
Attitudes to energy efficiency 
and sustainability 
 Attitudes to consumerism 
 Civic activism 
--  General GSG narratives 
Average dwelling (usable) 
floor area 
 Average household size 
 Housing affordability 
 Urban dwelling density 
 Settlement pattern (city scale) 
 Settlement pattern (neighbourhood scale) 
 Need for affordable housing 
 Type of building  General narratives from DRC. 
Average number and 
frequency of use of electric 
appliances 
 Average household size 
 Attitudes to consumerism 
 Income inequality 
 Attitudes to energy efficiency and 
sustainability 
 Information in the Technical document 
Dwelling area per occupant 
 Average household size 
 Household overcrowding 




 Energy efficiency of building and urban morphology 
 Income 
 Income inequality 
 Public service spending 
 Community cohesion 
 Energy prices (domestic) 
 Adoption of domestic (or 
community) microgeneration 
-- 
Energy prices (domestic) 
-- --  Information in the E[R] report  
 Information in the Technical document 
 Table generation tool 
Type of building 
 Adaptability of buildings and supporting 
infrastructure to new use 
 Settlement pattern (city scale) 
 Settlement pattern (neighbourhood scale) 
 Urban dwelling density 
 Total amount of green space 
 Urbanization 
 Land use 
 Planning policy 
 Planning adherence 




Use of electric space (and 
water) heating 
--  Adoption of domestic (or 
community) microgeneration 
 Attitudes to energy efficiency and 
sustainability 
 Energy prices (domestic) 
 Information in E[R]  






Figure 2. Analogy between the derivation of the characteristics of a new indicator for one scenario and a sum: the added information given by the characteristics 284 












2.1 Indicator 'Energy prices (domestic)' 288 
 289 
The previous method was not used to develop the indicator 'Energy prices (domestic)', as there are 290 
many factors which influence these prices and most of these factors are not related to the indicators 291 
from DRC. Based on the fact that the GSG used previous versions of the Energy [R]evolution report 292 
(Greenpeace/EREC, 2007, 2008) to develop the energy-related information of their scenarios, the basis 293 
to develop the characteristics of this indicator was the information about future energy prices from the 294 
latest Energy [R]evolution report (Greenpeace, 2015). See Appendix A7 for details. 295 
 296 
 297 
3 Results 298 
 299 
The results of this work are presented here in table form (Table 2). The table shows the indicators 300 
developed, their metrics and baselines. Next to them, for each scenario it shows their global tendency 301 
in relation to the baseline (by means of an arrow) and their characteristics. The scenarios are: New 302 
Sustainability Paradigm (NSP), Policy Reform (PR), Market Forces (MF), and Fortress World (FW). 303 
 304 
Part of the results which give context to this table can be found in the Appendix. There, the following 305 
information is provided for each indicator: a justification or definition, the question it answers, an 306 
extended version of the baseline*, and a short description of its context for each scenario (Table A1 - 307 
Review and context)*. It is recommended to have the Appendix at hand when using the results table. 308 
(* not available for all indicators) 309 
 310 





Table 2. Indicators table: characteristics of each of the new indicators for each scenario. 313 
Indicator Metric Baseline 
Characteristics 
























































Most domestic energy 
consumption is met with 
microgeneration, mainly at 
community level. 
⇑ 
A large percentage of 
domestic energy 
consumption is met with on-




increases but the percentage 
of domestic energy met by it 
is not very large. 
⇑ | ⇓ 
The overall adoption of 
microgeneration and the 
percentage of domestic 
energy met by it are slightly 








































People have the will to be 
sustainable, the information 
to be so is widely available, 
and rules and society favour 
it. The result is a very 
sustainable society with 
people willing and able to be 
sustainable. 
⇑ 
People's mindset does not 
change substantially from the 
current. However, the 
government puts a lot of 
effort in sustainable 
measures to make 
sustainability the default 
option. Information is reliable 
and available, making it 
easier to act sustainably. The 
result is a society which is 
more sustainable than 
currently (but far less than in 
NSP), especially the 
individuals who are engaged. 
⇓ 
Sustainability is far from 
being a priority for the people, 
rules do not favour it in any 
especial way, information is 
still poor and confusing, and 
society does not make it easy 
to be sustainable. There is no 
big change in society's 
sustainable attitudes although 
they worsen, and society 
makes it as difficult to be 
sustainable as currently or 
more. The result is a society 
which is less sustainable. 
⇓ | ⇓ 
Rich: governments try to 
keep up with sustainability 
measures but their priority is 
security. People, locked up in 
their enclaves, are not —or 
do not want to be— aware of 
the rest of the world. Their 
attitudes to sustainability are 
almost inexistent. 
Poor: although some —
especially the youth— grow 
expectations of fairness and 
may dream of sustainability, 
they have many much more 






































of 95 m2 
(2013) 
⇔ 
Although people tend to live 
together in larger households 
than currently, the average 
dwelling usable floor area 
decreases only slightly. This 
is mainly due to the increased 
use of flats rather than 
houses and is exacerbated 
by the co-housing movement. 
⇓ 
As household size decreases 
and there is an increase in 
typically smaller dwellings 
(flats), the average dwelling 
floor area decreases notably. 
⇓ 
The average dwelling floor 
area decreases. The main 
effect is, however, the 
polarisation: with a strong 
increase in dwellings with 
less than 50 m2 of internal 
floor space, and also an 
increase in those with more 
than 110 m². 
⇑ | ⇓ 
Rich: the average dwelling 
floor area for the rich is much 
higher than the current (110 
m² being close to their lower 
end). 
Poor: the average dwelling 
floor area for the poor is 
much lower than the current. 
Most of those with dwellings 
larger than 50 m2 share their 
dwelling and many cannot 




























































People tend to have and use 
appliances less than today. 
⇑ 
Appliance use and ownership 
is similar to current, only 
slightly higher due to smaller 
households. 
⇑ 
Dwellings have a larger 
number of appliances and 
they are more intensively 
used than today. 
⇑ | ⇓ 
Overall there are less 
appliances and are less used 
because of the large weight 





























The dwelling area per 
occupant decreases 
considerably out of choice 
(very homogeneously, there 
is almost no overcrowding). 
⇓ 
The area per occupant 
decreases moderately and 
homogenously, not by 
personal choice but due to 
regulations (e.g. favouring 
flats over houses, which tend 
to be smaller). 
⇑ 
The average area per 
occupant increases to some 
extent. However, the main 
contributors are middle to 
higher classes, as for a part 
of the lower classes it may 
decrease. 
⇑ | ⇓ 
Rich: increase greatly their 
area per occupant. 
Poor: decrease greatly their 

























s) (2015)  
⇓ 
Better housing, the almost 
inexistence of poor people, 
and government's and 
society's engagement reduce 
energy poverty to almost 
zero. 
⇓ 
The decrease in poor people, 
better housing and the 
engagement of the 
governments contribute to a 
strong decrease in energy 
poverty. 
⇔ 
Although inequality increases 
substantially, the high 
increase in GDP is able to 
keep energy poverty similar 
to current. 
⇓ | ⇑ 
No energy poverty among the 
rich. Almost all within the 































Electricity price will increase 
similarly to that in MF 
(17.36p/kWh). 
The gas price will decrease 
further than in PR (3.54 
p/kWh). 
e⇔ g⇓ 
Electricity price will be very 
similar to current, 
15.25+p/kWh.  
Gas price will steadily 
decrease until 3.54 p/kWh. 
e⇑ g⇑ 
Electricity price will increase 
almost steadily until 
17.36++p/kWh.  
Gas price will steadily 
increase until 6.21p/kWh. 
e⇑ g⇑ 
Electricity price will increase 
even further than in MF 
(17.36+++ p/kWh). 
Gas price will increase but 
































Terraced: similar with 
tendency to decrease. 
(Semi-) detached: decrease. 
Flats: increase. 
Terraced: slight increase. 
(Semi-) detached: decrease 
(especially semi-detached, as 
people who can afford it 
prefer to pay more (detached) 




(Semi-) detached: increase. 
Rich: 
Flats: strong decrease. 
Terraced: slight increase. 
(Semi-) detached: strong 
increase. 
Poor: 
Flats: stay the same 
percentage. 
Terraced: decrease. 
(Semi-) detached: strong 
decrease. 
Appearance of large informal 
developments with shacks 













































There is a moderate increase 
in use of electric space 
heating. 
⇑ 
There is an important growth 
in the use of electric space 
heating, mainly incentivised 
by the government. Probably 
the increase is slightly 
smaller in electric water 
heating as technologies as 
solar thermal are normally not 
used for space heating. 
⇑ 
There is a slow increase in 
the use of electric space and 
water heating systems. 
⇑ | ⇓ 
The general trend is a slight 
decrease in the use of 
electric space and water 
heating systems. However, it 
increases within the rich.  






4 Case study 317 
 318 
To demonstrate the utility of the indicators and characteristics developed in this work, DRC is used with 319 
the additions presented here to evaluate the resilience of one of the recommendations of the Swedish 320 
measurement campaign mentioned in the introduction (Zimmermann, 2009): the implementation of a 321 
ban to appliances with standby power above 0.5 W.  322 
 323 
The UF methodology consists of 4 steps: 1) identify a solution-benefit pair, 2) identify the necessary 324 
conditions, 3) determine the performance of necessary conditions in each scenario, and 4) determine 325 
the resilience of the pair in the future. With this information one can decide whether to implement the 326 
solution or not. For more details about the UF methodology see Lombardi et al., (2012) or Rogers et 327 
al., (2012). 328 
 329 
The benefit of the solution chosen is to decrease the electricity consumed in households. Therefore, 330 
the solution-benefit pair is: 'implementation of a ban on appliances with standby power above 0.5 W'-331 
'decrease the electricity consumed in households'. 332 
 333 
The identified necessary conditions for this solution-benefit pair to work are: 334 
1. Appliances must be used 335 
2. Users must use standby mode 336 
3. Governments must be able to enforce the ban 337 
4. Policy must be maintained despite changes in government 338 
 339 
Table 3 shows the summary of the futures analysis for the necessary conditions above. The 340 
characteristics of 'Average number and frequency of use of electric appliances' directly determine the 341 
performance of condition 1. To determine the performance of condition 2, the characteristics of several 342 
indicators are needed, with 'Attitudes to energy efficiency and sustainability' and 'Energy price 343 
(domestic)' being central. For the other two necessary conditions, the existing DRC covers their 344 
analysis. Therefore, without the additions presented in this paper, a user choosing to evaluate the 345 




conditions 1 and 2. This means that such evaluation would have probably been done without some of 347 
the relevant information, and this would likely cause the result to be less consistent. 348 
 349 
Table 3. Summary of the futures analysis of the conditions needed for the pair 'implementation of a ban 350 
to appliances with standby power above 0.5 W'-'decrease the electricity consumed in households' (🗸, 351 
supported in the scenario; ?, questionable if supported in the scenario; 🞩, not supported in the 352 
scenario).  353 
Condition 
Performance 
NSP PR MF 
FW 
(rich|poor) 
Appliances must be used 🗸 🗸 🗸 🗸 | 🞩  
Users use standby mode ? 🗸 🗸 🗸 | 🞩 
Governments must be able to enforce the ban 🗸 🗸 ? ? 
Policy is maintained despite changes in government 🗸 🗸 ? ? 
 354 
 355 
The results of the analysis recommend implementing the solution because it delivers benefits in all 356 
scenarios. Its weak points are in MF and FW, where pressure from users (MF) and/or from producers 357 
(MF and FW) could lead the government to either withdrawal the measure or be lax in its application; 358 
and in FW where it is not useful for the poor. However, the application of the measure obliges producers 359 
to develop low consuming standby modes which are appealing to users. Only if producers do not 360 
manage to do it, or the implementation of these standby modes continues to be expensive for the 361 
producers will these benefits be jeopardised. See Table 4 for a synthesis of the results for each 362 
scenario. 363 
 364 
Table 4. Synthesis of the results of the futures analysis of the solution-benefit pair 'implementation of a 365 
ban to appliances with standby power above 0.5 W'-'decrease the electricity consumed in households'. 366 
NSP PR MF FW 
The solution delivers 
its intended benefits. It 
does so less than in PR 
because it is less 
needed: fewer 
appliances are used 
and they are often fully 
stopped instead of left 
in standby mode. 
All conditions perform 
well. In this scenario, 
the solution is useful 
and needed. 
This is a very useful 
and needed solution in 
this scenario. 
However, it is possible 
that it is withdrawn due 
to market pressures 
(from users or 
producers), or not fully 
enforced. 
This is a useful and 
needed solution for the 
rich only, as the poor 
barely use appliances 
and turn them off when 
not in use. Although 
the government is 
more keen than in MF 
in securing resources, 
they may make 
exceptions when faced 
with large companies. 
 367 




5 Discussion 369 
 370 
It is important to apply futures analysis to sustainable interventions of all kinds to evaluate their 371 
resilience and decrease by design the possibility that assets grow stranded while still operative. 372 
Broadening the possible uses of scenario analysis to specific domains, as done in this work, may help 373 
in this regard. 374 
 375 
This work shows how, indeed, the scenarios from 'Designing Resilient Cities' (DRC) can be 376 
complemented and adapted to the specific needs of the user. Figure 3 portrays it graphically: some 377 
factors affecting the energy demand in households were not characterised in DRC; they have now been 378 
characterised and complement the tool. The scenarios adapted here have a structure —a general 379 
narrative plus the characteristics of a set of indicators (Figure 1)— very similar to that of a large body 380 
of scenarios developed in the literature. Therefore, this work demonstrates also how such types of 381 
scenarios could be adapted to study specific domains of interest outside the original scope of the 382 
scenario. 383 
 384 
As the case study shows, the generation of the new indicators presented here allows the systematic 385 
evaluation of interventions aimed at decreasing the energy consumed in households. This 386 
demonstrates the power of future scenarios and their possible extensions to help reveal where 387 
alternative thinking may help policy and practice. The specific extension presented here also allows, for 388 
example, to explore the evolution of different aspects related to the household energy demand in the 389 
different future scenarios, or to project into them current household energy demand data to study their 390 
evolution. These properties can be used to inform better regulations or interventions related to the built 391 
environment or to plan better, more resilient, energy networks to supply dwellings. 392 
 393 
This paper further supports the evidence from the extensive literature regarding future scenarios, in that 394 
these are powerful tools to help thinking about the future. In addition, not only does it convey the 395 
additional tables of characteristics for each scenario to aid that thinking; it also trains the readers in the 396 
process of future thinking and scenario building so that they can form their own arguments. The readers, 397 






Figure 3. Graphical description of the work done for this paper and how it complements the scenarios 401 
from DRC. Some of the attributes represented by the indicators from DRC are factors affecting the 402 
energy demand of households. The work done here has defined indicators to represent the missing 403 
factors affecting the energy demand of households and characterised them to complement the 404 
scenarios from DRC. 405 




6 Conclusions 407 
 408 
In order for any intervention not to lose its effectiveness in the future, it is important to make sure it is 409 
resilient regardless how the future evolves. Future scenarios are a good tool for helping to designing 410 
such resilient interventions. In particular, buildings are responsible for a significant proportion of the 411 
greenhouse gas emissions and their average lifespans are very long. It is, therefore, crucial for any 412 
intervention in the built environment to deliver its desired effects irrespective of the future which arises. 413 
In addition, future scenarios can as well reveal where alternative thinking may help to improve policy 414 
for a changing future. 415 
 416 
The factors affecting the energy demand in households are complex and interrelated. However, it is 417 
possible to curate a set of indicators to take them into account and characterise their evolution in a 418 
range of distinct futures. 419 
 420 
A set of indicators were characterised to adapt the tool 'Designing Resilient Cities' (DRC) to the study 421 
of the energy demand in the residential sector. As shown with the case study, this set of indicators can 422 
be successfully used, together with DRC, to evaluate the resilience of interventions aimed at decreasing 423 
the energy demand in households. This can be used to improve the design of any kind of intervention 424 
in this domain, i.e. policy related to housing or interventions aimed at decreasing the energy demand in 425 
households. 426 
 427 
This paper has demonstrated the methods used to expand existing future scenarios. In doing so, it 428 
trains the readers in future thinking, which they can then use in other domains. 429 
 430 
As future work, DRC could be extended to other specific domains of the urban environment. It could 431 
also be adapted to other urban environments or to take climate change into account. 432 
 433 





A Derivation of indicators 436 
A1 Adoption of domestic (or community) microgeneration 437 
 438 
Definition/Justification: Microgeneration partly avoids the need to demand energy. 439 
 440 
Question: What's the percentage of domestic energy consumption met by microgeneration? 441 
Baseline UK: in 2016, consumption of self-produced electricity by the domestic sector was 1356 GWh, 442 
which accounts for 1.3 % of all domestic consumption (BEIS, 2012), with a total capacity of 2.55 GW 443 
(Ofgem, 2017). Total capacity of community installations was about 0.23 GW (Ofgem, 2017), 444 
accounting for ~0.1 % of consumption. In 2010 total installed microgeneration capacity (including 445 
commercial and industrial) in UK was almost zero. 446 
Review and context: See Table A1. 447 
 448 
 449 
A2 Attitudes to energy efficiency and sustainability 450 
 451 
Justification/definition: This indicator does not measure intentions but results; therefore, it includes 452 
education as well as personal preferences, habits and social trends. Intentions do not always match 453 
results; partly due to lack of knowledge, difficulty to change habits (Huebner, Cooper and Jones, 2013; 454 
Huebner et al., 2015b), or social environment making it difficult. 455 
 456 
Question: What are the general attitudes, knowledge and ease to act in a sustainable way of the 457 
population? 458 
Baseline UK (2018): Lack of sustainable alternatives and of simple, coherent and relevant information 459 
(The Guardian, 2010; Nuttall and Shankar, 2017). A small proportion of population actively tries to 460 
reduce their energy consumption and to be more sustainable in general, but lack of reliable information, 461 
difficulty to do what is needed in the current society, consumerism, and social inertia makes it very effort 462 
intensive. Therefore, many people tend to pick one 'cause' (e. g. avoidance of plastics or veganism) 463 




good intentions, results are usually very poor due to misinformation, difficulty to change habits and 465 
social inertia. And for those who are most knowledgeable, the tension between what they know they 466 
should do and what they can actually do can even lead to paralysis (Longo, Shankar and Nuttall, 2017).  467 
Saving energy is an idea not promoted beyond it being for saving money (Thøgersen, Curtis and Smith, 468 
2012), therefore it is not high in the sustainability 'causes' list. 469 
 470 
 471 
A3 Average dwelling (usable) floor area 472 
 473 
Justification/definition: Larger dwellings tend to consume more energy (Wright, 2008). Also, together 474 
with 'Average household size' it gives information on the average number of occupants per usable area 475 
dwellings have, which relates to the amount of energy used in dwellings (see Appendix A5). 476 
 477 
Question: How much floor area do dwellings have in comparison to the baseline? 478 
Baseline UK (2013): mean total usable floor area of 95 m2; 9.4 % have less than 50 m2 of internal floor 479 
space, 24.9 % have at least 110 m2 of internal floor space (Department for Communities and Local 480 
Government, 2015) (Number of dwellings in UK (2013): 23.3 million). 481 
Review and context: See Table A1. 482 
 483 
 484 
A4 Average number and frequency of use of electric appliances 485 
 486 
Justification and/or definition: "Electrical appliances make a very significant contribution to a 487 
household's electricity consumption. This impact not only relates to the number of each type of 488 
appliance owned, but also to the power demand and frequency of use." (Jones, Fuertes and Lomas, 489 
2015) 490 
 491 
Question: How is the use of household appliances in the scenario? 492 




- Laundry appliances: washing machines in 97 % of households. Median use 4x week at 40 ºC or 494 
less. Tumble dryers in 67 % of households. Median use 3x week in winter, few use them in summer. 495 
- Refrigeration appliances: refrigerators in 99 % of households (can be combined with freezer). 496 
Freezers in 93 % of households. 497 
- Dishwashers: in 41 % of households. Median use 4x week. 498 
- Cooking appliances: around 38 % of households have electric hobs, around 70 % electric oven, 499 
and around 80 % microwave. Use is not determined but the survey 'PERIscope 2017' (Bord Bia, 500 
2018) shows how often people cook food from scratch: Once/few times a day (34 %), Few times a 501 
week (31 %), Once a week (11 %), Once/few times a month (7 %), Less often (9 %), Never (9 %) 502 
- Information and communication technologies, and home entertainment: Median number of TVs in 503 
homes is 2, the most used one runs 5 to 6 hours per day. No concrete data for other appliances, 504 
but different sources show an increase in sells (Euromonitor, 2018), and in appliance energy use 505 
(Palmer and Cooper, 2013) in the last years. 506 
Review and context: See Table A1. 507 
 508 
 509 
A5 Dwelling area per occupant 510 
 511 
Justification and/or definition: it relates to the amount of energy used in dwellings: more density of 512 
occupants means less space heating per person and more likelihood of sharing consumer items 513 
(Bhattacharjee and Reichard, 2011). 514 
 515 
Question: What's the average area per occupant in dwellings? 516 
Baseline UK (2011-13): Average household size (2011): 2.3 (Office for National Statistics, 2013) (the 517 
indicator in DRC shows 2.4, which is the value from 2001). Average dwelling (usable) floor area (2013) 518 
95 m2. The result is one occupant every 41.3 m2. 519 
 520 
 521 




A6 Energy poverty 523 
 524 
Definition: "Fuel poverty in England is measured using the 'Low Income High Costs' indicator, which 525 
considers a household to be fuel poor if: 1) they have required fuel costs that are above average (the 526 
national median level); 2) were they to spend that amount, they would be left with a residual income 527 
below the official poverty line." (BEIS, 2017a) 528 
 529 
Question: What is the percentage of population in energy poverty? 530 
Baseline UK (2015): around 11.0 % (approximately 2.50 million households) (BEIS, 2017a). It has been 531 
fluctuating less than 2 percentage points since 2003, between more than 10 % and less than 12 %. The 532 
average fuel poverty gap in 2015 was £353, which has been slowly decreasing since peaking in 2012 533 
after at least 10 years rising. 534 
Review and context: See Table A1. 535 
 536 
 537 
A7 Energy prices (domestic) 538 
 539 
Justification: The price of the domestic energy can influence the energy demand of households, 540 
especially those with low income (BEIS, 2017a). This effect may be amplified if energy prices and 541 
energy consumption are made visible and may be used to decrease peak demand —by changing 542 
energy pricing depending on the time of the day (Darby, 2006). It is expected that an increase in energy 543 
prices would incentivise adoption of on-site generation (Jager, 2006). 544 
A forecast of the future energy prices is outside the scope of this research. However, the relative 545 
differences between scenarios and a rough relation to current values is what we can evaluate. 546 
 547 
Definition: Average UK domestic energy price (incl. taxes) for a medium customer for a given year. 548 
Question: What are the average energy prices of domestic energy (electricity and gas) for a given year? 549 
Baseline UK (2016): Average for medium consumers, 2016. Electricity price: 15.47 p/kWh (2012: 14.05 550 





The Global Scenarios Group used Greenpeace's 'Energy [R]evolution' reports (2007, 2008) to help to 553 
generate the energy related data in their scenarios. These reports portray a Reference scenario (Ref) 554 
and an Energy [R]evolution scenario (E[R]) which are broadly compatible with Market Forces (MF) and 555 
Policy Reform (PR) respectively. In more recent reports, another scenario is added, Advanced Energy 556 
[R]evolution scenario (AE[R]). This scenario is, however, not compatible with any of the other scenarios 557 
used in DRC. Reproductions of the figures and tables used to characterise this indicator can be found 558 
in section S2 of the Supplementary information document. They belong to three sources: 1) the latest 559 
Energy [R]evolution report by Greenpeace, (2015) (figure 6.4.6 and table 5.4; the figure shows the 560 
development of the electricity generation costs in Ref, E[R] and AE[R] for OECD Europe, and the table 561 
shows the projections for fossil fuel and biomass prices for different parts of the world until 2050), 2) 562 
the technical document of the GSG's scenarios (by Electris et al., (2009); figure 3-44, which shows the 563 
electricity generation shares in 2050 in MF and PR compared to those in 2005), and 3) the table 564 
generator tool by Tellus Institute, (2018) (which shows the values for different Western Europe 565 
scenarios of selected indicators in different points in the future). 566 
 567 
Calculations of final electricity prices in Ref and E[R] (based on information given in Figure 6.4.6 568 
(Greenpeace, 2015), see Figure S2 in the Supplementary information document) 569 
We are interested in the rough evolution of the electricity prices. For that, it is assumed they are 570 
proportional to the electricity generation costs and that this proportionality will not change in time. It 571 
is also assumed that taxes stay constant. With these assumptions, the relation between the price of 572 
UK domestic electricity and the electricity generation costs in 2012 is the same as the relation 573 
between the electricity prices and generation costs in 2050 (for the different scenarios). Therefore, 574 
a simple rule of three can be used to derive the final electricity prices in Ref and E[R] by measuring 575 
the relative increases in electricity generation costs in the figures. This leads to: 576 
 577 
Final electricity price in E[R]: 15.25 p/kWh (with a maximum price in 2030 of 18.51 p/kWh) 578 
Final electricity price in Ref: 17.36 p/kWh 579 
 580 
Both, the Global Scenarios Group and Greenpeace assume a decrease in the use of nuclear energy in 581 




to go in the opposite direction in spite of the increases in electricity costs which this implies (HM 583 
Government, 2013; BEIS, 2017b). The narratives of the scenarios suggest this increase will be higher 584 
in Ref/MF (17.36++ p/kWh) than E[R]/PR (15.25+ p/kWh). 585 
 586 
Calculations of final gas prices in Ref and E[R] (based on information given in Table 5.4 587 
(Greenpeace, 2015) see Figure S3 in the Supplementary information document) 588 
The procedure here is similar than that used with the electricity prices: the price for UK domestic gas 589 
in 2012 is defined as proportional to the value for Europe in 2012/2013 shown in the table, and with 590 
a rule of three the price for 2050 is obtained. 591 
 592 
Final gas price in E[R]: 3.54 p/kWh 593 
Final price in Ref: 6.21 p/kWh 594 
 595 
Review and context: See Table A1. 596 
 597 
 598 
A8 Type of building 599 
 600 
Justification: Although it is expected that in OECD member countries approximately 75 % of 2013 601 
building stock will still be standing in 2050 (IEA, 2013) and, that in the case of UK, more than two-thirds 602 
of the 2050 housing stock was already built in 2005 (Boardman et al., 2005), the remaining stock will 603 
have an impact on both, direct energy consumption (e. g. blocks of buildings use less energy than 604 
detached houses) (Bhattacharjee and Reichard, 2011; Jones and Lomas, 2015; Jones, Fuertes and 605 
Lomas, 2015) and the heat island effect (gardens help mitigate heat island effect, blocks of buildings 606 
increase it) (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2008). 607 
 608 
Question: What is the composition of the domestic building stock? 609 
Baseline UK (2013): End terrace 10.4 %, mid terrace 18.8 %, semidetached 27.6 %, detached 22.6 %, 610 




%, mid terrace 12.9 %, semidetached 11.0 %, detached 23.7 %, flat 42.2 % (Department for 612 
Communities and Local Government, 2015). 613 
Review and context: See Table A1. 614 
 615 
 616 
A9 Use of electric space (and water) heating 617 
 618 
Justification and/or definition: Heating (space and water) is the largest slice of UK household energy 619 
use (80 %) (Palmer and Cooper, 2013), therefore the amount of dwellings using electric heating has a 620 
huge impact in the electricity network's load. "In almost all cases, households that use electricity for 621 
space heating also use electricity for water heating" and "the vast majority of households that use 622 
electric water heating also use electricity for space heating" (Ofgem, 2015), therefore it does not make 623 
sense to separate space and water heating in two distinct indicators. 624 
Currently electric heating is not common in the UK and is more expensive than gas heating. However, 625 
it is expected to grow by the popularisation of heat pumps, as they are more efficient than other types 626 
of electric heating and still are a minority in UK ("typically, heat pumps can produce from 2.5 to 4 times 627 
as much useful heat as the amount of high-grade energy input, with variations due to seasonal 628 
performance" (Greenpeace, 2015)). The adoption of microgeneration should also push in this direction 629 
in the scenarios where decreasing emissions is valued. 630 
 631 
Question: What's the percentage of households using electric space (and water) heating? 632 
Review and context: See Table A1. 633 
 634 
 635 





Table A1 - Review and context. Short description of the context of the new indicators in each scenario. 638 
Review and context 









































Community energy generation units 
are widely adopted. There are 
polices encouraging 
microgeneration, the public has the 
willingness and the information to 
adopt it, and total energy demand in 
households decrease sharply due to 
better dwellings and better use by 
occupants. 
On-site generation is cheap, 
electricity is relatively expensive, and 
government incentivises clean 
energy and promotes community 
microgeneration stations. People are 
not especially inclined to adopt 
microgeneration, but it is profitable, 
therefore there is a wide penetration. 
Buildings are generally better 
insulated. 
On site generation is not too cheap, 
but high energy prices stimulate the 
uptake of domestic microgeneration 
by who can afford it. Buildings still 
consume a lot of energy, therefore, 
although on-site microgeneration 
increases, the percentage of 
domestic energy met by it is much 
less than in NSP and PR. 
Rich: high energy prices make it 
favourable for them to install 
microgeneration devises as in MF. 
Poor: they cannot afford individual 
microgeneration devises, but in the 
cases where communities are in 
good terms and not too poor, they 





























There are more people living 
together, sometimes as co-housing, 
sometimes with friends, extended 
family or other families. The dwelling 
density increases because although 
flat apartments may be slightly larger 
than today, they are still smaller than 
current average terraced and 
detached houses, and many choose 
higher quality but smaller homes. 
However, the amount of very small 
dwellings decreases due to a 
decreased interest in living alone and 
the almost inexistence of poor 
people. 
As current individualistic trends 
continue, there is a trend toward 
smaller household sizes (people do 
not want to share accommodation). It 
is common to divide large houses in 
two to accommodate to the market 
and new built tend to be smaller flats 
rather than larger houses. 
There is a trend towards smaller 
household sizes as people do not 
want to share accommodation. At the 
same time, the affordability of 
housing decreases, there is more 
substandard housing. There is a high 
disparity in urban dwelling density; in 
high income zones there is a 
prevalence of houses, while in low 
income zones there is a prevalence 
of flats. 
Rich live in a similar way to the 
current (or MF) upper 10 % or 15 %. 
A large part of the poor who can 
afford to live in formal developments 
have to share the dwelling with other 
families. Most of those who do not 
share their dwelling do so only 
because they have been able to 
divide it or because the dwelling is 
already very small. There are plenty 
of informal developments. The trends 














































Larger households and the will of the 
society make sharing home 
appliances the norm. More engaged 
and sustainable society also has the 
effect reducing the superfluous use 
and ownership of appliances. 
Households tend to be slightly 
smaller than today therefore 
appliances are shared by less users. 
People's search for novelty and 
status continues mostly unchanged, 
therefore the ownership and use of 
appliances increases slightly. 
Households are smaller, there is less 
interest for sustainability and more 
consumerism (the amount of 
appliances increases until 2025). 
Lower earners may not be able to 
afford all the appliances they would 
like to have, but this does not 
counteract the general trend. 
Rich: the situation is similar to that of 
the top 20 % in MF. 
Poor: they cannot afford much. Most 
of them have less appliances than 
they need —if they can afford to own 
some. Sharing, repairing, reusing, 
repurposing and recycling appliances 
















Better housing insulation, increase in 
GDP per capita, decrease of income 
inequality, and increase in public 
service spending highly reduce the 
risk of energy poverty. Government 
helps financing community or on-site 
microgeneration if needed. The 
extremely few instances of energy 
poverty can count on the community 
to alleviate their problem. 
Better housing insulation and 
increase in GDP per capita decrease 
energy poverty. The state provides 
better insulation, domestic energy 
generation and energy tax discounts 
if needed. Lower gas prices also help 
decrease fuel poverty. 
Housing insulation is similar to 
current with no better use of sun. 
Although GDP increases 
substantially, also the gap between 
rich and poor increases, leaving a 
large portion of society at risk of fuel 
poverty. The moderate increase of 
energy prices (in comparison with 
that of GDP) leave 'only' lowest 
earners and those living in especially 
badly insulated dwellings in energy 
poverty. Government cannot help 
mitigate it as it has to spend a lot in 
other issues (such as health). 
Obviously there are no energy poor 
between the rich. The poor, however, 
are virtually all energy poor —
although the definition of energy 
poverty partially brakes in this case 
as it is difficult to define "required fuel 
costs" for those who live in informal 
developments. Those who live in 
formal developments struggle with 
high energy costs and low building 
standards. Burning (coal, wood…) is 




















In this scenario the general amount 
of energy consumed is approximately 
one third lower than in PR and it is 
mostly in form of electric energy as 
well. The share which comes from 
renewable sources is only slightly 
higher than in PR. This means that 
the electricity price will be moderately 
higher than in PR as prices will lower 
slower (lower increase with same 
learning factor implies slower price 
reduction). Gas demand is around 25 
% lower, which will decrease its price 
even further. 
An increase (peaking in 2030 at 
18.51+ p/kWh) and posterior 
decrease of the electricity price are 
expected. This is due to the 
introduction of renewable energy 
sources, which are more expensive 
at the beginning. However, their price 
then decreases rapidly due to the 
high learning factor, especially in PV 
and CSP. In fact, in 2050 the energy 
from renewable sources is generally 
cheaper than that which comes from 
fossil fuels (Greenpeace, 2015). 
However, lack of demand reduces 
gas price. 
Increasing prices of fossil fuels (the 
more depleted they are, the more 
expensive to obtain more it is), low 
uptake of renewables (slowing price 
reduction due to learning factor) and 
increased use of nuclear power, 
make electricity prices increase 
steadily. The increasing prices of 
fossil fuels also affects gas prices. 
In this scenario, the general amount 
of energy consumed is approximately 
10 % lower than in MF and its 
sources are very similar, with a slight 
decrease of oil and gas in favour to 
coal, nuclear and biomass. In this 
case, biomass is not used to 
generate electricity; instead it is used 
by the poor as a source of heat and 
for cooking. The same is probably 
true for the increase of coal. The 
further increase in nuclear share 
affects the electricity price making it 
slightly more expensive than in MF. 
Gas demand is lower than in MF and 
















There is a decrease in land use, and 
an increase in urbanization and in 
the amount of green space. This 
leads to higher dwelling densities. 
There are less dwellings built than in 
other scenarios due to high 
adaptation of current stock. Current 
trends increasing the proportion of 
flats are exacerbated, and there are 
very few new (semi-) detached 
houses constructed. Construction of 
terraced houses stays similar. Green 
space may be gained where there 
were old single-family houses with 
garden, especially (semi-) detached 
houses. Community feeling drives a 
decrease in demand of privacy. 
The percentage of new built remains 
similar, with a decrease in detached 
houses in favour to terraced. This 
increases dwelling density due to the 
high percentage of new flats 
constructed (mainly in city centres) 
and lower percentage of (semi-) 
detached houses. However, there is 
high adaptability of the existing stock, 
which decreases the amount of new 
built in relation to other scenarios. 
Terraced and (semi-) detached 
houses are still in high demand as 
people seek privacy. 
In highly popular and in lower income 
neighbourhoods there is a high 
increase of flats, while in high income 
neighbourhoods what increases is 
the presence of new (semi-) 
detached houses. This scenario 
presents strong "type of building 
polarisation". Besides, the 
replacement levels are high, 
therefore there are more buildings 
built than in other scenarios. 
There is an overall decrease in 
dwelling density, but the polarisation 
between rich and poor is extreme in 
this scenario. The rich live mainly in 
detached and semi-detached 
houses, except by in popular zones, 
where there is a good provision of 
high profile flats too. The poor inhabit 
previously built flats and, in some 
regions, terraced houses (normally 
shared between several families). In 
formal developments new flats are 
the only new construction. In in-
formal developments dwellings are 

































Although there is a stronger 
decrease in greenhouse gases 
produced by household heating than 
in PR (and electricity is clean), the 
uptake of electric space and water 
heating is lower here. The reason is 
that there is a much greater increase 
of district heating and other forms of 
dwelling heating technologies which 
use the sun and earth's heat. 
Although gas is cheap, as the 
government is leading a transition to 
clean energy sources, it incentivises 
district heating when feasible (often 
geothermal) and electric heating 
otherwise. The combination of 
microgeneration and electric heating 
is especially appealing for 
customers. Other heating 
technologies such as solar thermal 
also have their role in order to 
replace gas for heating (mostly 
water) purposes. 
Proportionally, the increase in gas 
price is much higher than that of the 
electricity. This will increase the 
installation of heat pumps in new 
built and when systems need to be 
changed. Those who have on-site 
energy generation will also prefer 
electric heating. 
Rich: similar to MF but probably 
slightly larger as nuclear energy 
seem to be preferred than other 
sources of energy like gas. 
Poor: they are mostly energy poor, 
therefore it decreases their use of 
electric heating. They mostly use 
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Figures and tables caption list: 819 
 820 
Figure 1. DRC scenarios narrative composition. The narrative of each scenario comprises a brief 821 
general narrative describing the main aspects of the scenario, and the characteristics describing the 822 
performance of a set of indicators in the scenario. These indicators are variables representing one or 823 
more attributes of the system. 824 
 825 
Figure 2. Analogy between the derivation of the characteristics of a new indicator for one scenario and 826 
a sum: the added information given by the characteristics of the relevant indicators and other relevant 827 
information "logically produces" the characteristics of the new indicator as result. 828 
 829 
Figure 3. Graphical description of the work done for this paper and how it complements the scenarios 830 
from DRC. Some of the attributes represented by the indicators from DRC are factors affecting the 831 
energy demand of households. The work done here has defined indicators to represent the missing 832 
factors affecting the energy demand of households and characterised them to complement the 833 
scenarios from DRC. 834 
 835 
 836 
Table 1. Indicators and other information used to derive each of the new indicator's characteristics. 837 
References: E[R] report (Greenpeace, 2015), General narratives from DRC (Lombardi et al., 2012), 838 
General GSG narratives (Hunt et al., 2012b), Technical document (Electris et al., 2009), Table 839 
generator tool (Tellus Institute, 2018). 840 
 841 
Table 2. Indicators table: characteristics of each of the new indicators for each scenario. 842 
 843 
Table 3. Summary of the futures analysis of the conditions needed for the pair 'implementation of a ban 844 
to appliances with standby power above 0.5 W'-'decrease the electricity consumed in households' (🗸, 845 
supported in the scenario; ?, questionable if supported in the scenario; 🞩, not supported in the 846 





Table 4. Synthesis of the results of the futures analysis of the solution-benefit pair 'implementation of a 849 
ban to appliances with standby power above 0.5 W'-'decrease the electricity consumed in households'. 850 
 851 
Table A1 - Review and context. Short description of the context of each of the new indicators for each 852 
scenario. 853 
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